The Swiss price regulator has concluded mutual agreements with internet platforms such as Ricardo and ImmoScout24 for the first time. This novel regulatory measure has potentially far-reaching consequences for digital platform operators, advertisers, and market regulation. We analyze the legal basis, regulatory instruments, and practical consequences of this development in the context of competition law and the digital economy, and show why this step is more than just a “deal” between authorities and tech companies.
A new era in platform regulation
At first glance, the agreement between a government regulatory authority and private platform providers may seem harmless. But in reality, Switzerland is at a turning point in its approach to the platform economy. The price supervisor has concluded agreements with Ricardo and a number of leading real estate platforms that are remarkable both legally and economically. They mark the beginning of a new phase of government control over digitalized markets – not through bans or interventions by decree, but through “soft regulation” with binding character. This raises key questions:
- How can market failure in digital ecosystems be addressed in a legally secure manner?
- How far can price regulation go in the private sector?
- And what signal effect do these agreements have on other sectors of the economy?
Price monitoring in the digital economy
With the Price Supervision Act (PüG, SR 942.20), Swiss lawmakers have created a flexible but effective tool for combating excessive prices, especially where there is no functioning competition. This tool has been tried and tested for decades in traditional markets, such as healthcare and postal services. With the move into the world of digital platforms, the scope of application is now expanding to markets that are strongly influenced by network effects, winner-takes-all dynamics, and information asymmetries.
Digital platforms have developed systemic relevance for market processes: they not only control access to supply and demand, but also increasingly determine the rules of the game. This applies, for example, to the way visibility is generated (ranking), how fee structures are designed (e.g., at Ricardo), and how data is monetized. These developments often fall outside the scope of traditional competition law, as platforms may in fact be dominant in the market but are not necessarily subject to antitrust law in formal terms.
Price monitoring as an alternative competition regime
In digital markets in particular, the transition from competition to structural dependency is fluid. The price supervisor plays a hybrid role here: he does not intervene with sanctions, but negotiates, observes, and intervenes using instruments that have a high public impact. Mutually agreed regulations in accordance with Art. 9 PüG are a particularly effective measure because they are consensus-oriented. However, they require the price supervisor to have previously identified an abuse.
In contrast to Art. 10 PüG, which regulates the issuance of a ruling in the event of disagreement, Art. 9 PüG is the central instrument for consensus-based solutions. The legal structure of such agreements is public law in nature: they are not administrative orders in the strict sense, but they are effectively binding and have a normative guiding effect on entire market segments. In addition, if made public, they are relevant to reputation and create a quasi-regulation for the entire sector: what applies to Ricardo or ImmoScout sets standards for the competition.
Details of the regulations agreed upon
Ricardo.ch: Success fees under regulatory scrutiny
Ricardo’s transaction structure was reviewed—in particular, the success fees charged for auctions or immediate purchases. In the past, these fees were criticized as being non-transparent and excessive. The agreement includes:
- A 10% discount for auctions with a starting price of CHF 1
- A 10% discount for large customers with annual sales of CHF 100,000 or more.
This creates an incentive system that makes professional or frequent trading particularly attractive. From the price regulator’s point of view, this contributes to strengthening competition in the secondary market. But the question arises: is a discount model sufficient to compensate for market-related price disadvantages? Critics could argue that discounts are a temporary cosmetic measure and do not solve the structural problems, such as a lack of alternatives or lock-in effects.
Real estate platforms: clarity through package prices
In the real estate sector, criticism was mainly directed at the complexity of pricing. The newly agreed packages, in particular “Flex Offer,” are intended to reduce this complexity. They provide for, for example:
- CHF 44 monthly basic fee,
- CHF 505 per property for sale / CHF 370 per rental property,
- unlimited duration of listings.
These flat rates simplify pricing, increase transparency, and promote comparability between platforms. From a legal perspective, this is a step toward standardized market conditions – without government price fixing. It is a regulatory “nudge” that encourages providers to behave in a more consumer-friendly manner.
Competition law and economic assessment
A key aspect of this development is the market structure: most of the platforms concerned belong to the Swiss Marketplace Group (SMG), which has gained a dominant position through numerous mergers (e.g., Homegate, ImmoScout24, AutoScout24). Even though competition law has not formally established a dominant market position, the number of complaints and price reviews show that de facto monopolies may exist.
From an economic perspective, these are so-called “two-sided markets,” in which providers serve both advertisers and end users—with different pricing systems. These markets are particularly susceptible to distortions of competition when, for example, cross-subsidization or lock-in effects occur. Price monitoring can serve as a corrective measure here when traditional market mechanisms fail.
A legally relevant aspect is the question of whether mutual agreements act as sector-specific market guidelines and to what extent they also have a de facto binding effect on third-party providers. Even if they are not generally binding, they effectively act as a market standard-setting practice, with the result that other platforms must also measure themselves against these prices. This raises questions about equal treatment and the competitive neutrality of government intervention.
Signal effect and future developments
With this latest step, the price regulator has arrived in the digital reality. He no longer acts solely as an auditor of traditional prices (e.g., in the rail or postal sectors), but as a moderator in asymmetric platform markets. In the medium term, this could lead to a more systematic regulatory strategy – for example, by extending consensual regulations to other types of platforms (e.g., job exchanges, vehicle portals, delivery services).
In this context, legislators could examine whether Art. 9 PüG should be accompanied by transparency requirements, disclosure obligations, or increased institutional control – particularly with regard to consistency with Art. 12–14 PüG, which define the conditions and characteristics of price abuse. Possible options include binding transparency requirements, reporting obligations for fee models, or institutionalized platform monitoring – similar to developments in the EU. It remains to be seen whether Swiss legislators will follow suit.
Recommendations for action
For platforms:
- Pricing models should be reviewed and harmonized where necessary.
- Early cooperation with authorities can minimize regulatory risks.
- It is advisable to expand internal governance to include regulatory risk management.
For companies:
- When using platforms, pricing models should be critically analyzed and compared with alternatives.
- In the case of excessive or opaque fees, the price supervisor can be contacted.
- The new regulations should serve as a benchmark for purchasing.
For legislators:
- It remains to be seen whether voluntary regulation will suffice or whether legislative adjustments will be necessary.
- The impact of consensual regulations should be evaluated and scientifically monitored.
Conclusion and outlook
The consensual regulations agreed between the price supervisor and internet platforms mark an important milestone in Swiss regulatory practice. They show that effective, constitutionally legitimate, and proportionate interventions are possible even in the digital economy – without stifling innovation. The decisive factor will be whether this model proves viable and whether it succeeds in striking a balance between entrepreneurial freedom and market fairness. Switzerland could serve as a model for “soft” but effective platform regulation in Europe.
Do you have questions about pricing or would you like to have your pricing checked for compliance with this new requirement? Our specialists will be happy to advise you.
Sources